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“An Altercation Full of Meaning”: The Duel between Francis B. Cutting
and John C. Breckinridge
Abstract

“A Duel!” In late March of 1854, the northern press burst with the news. A duel had allegedly taken place
between two members of the House of Representatives—Francis B. Cutting of New York and John C.
Breckinridge of Kentucky. Confusion and anticipation reigned, and a flurry of rumors circulated. Had
Breckinridge been shot in the neck? Was he killed or wounded? Did Cutting emerge victorious? Or was the
entire affair a mere hoax? The situation became so dramatic that it even appeared in a theatrical advertisement,
beckoning people to see a play that promised to be just as exciting as the alleged duel. By early April, it had
become clear that despite the conflict between Cutting and Breckinridge, an actual duel had been averted.
Although their misunderstanding had been amicably settled, the affair still left many questions unanswered.
Why did these two Congressmen feel compelled to resort to arms? And how did Cutting, a northerner, nearly
become embroiled in a duel—a violent ritual typically understood by historians today as an archaic institution
that was confined to the Old South? These questions can be partially answered by examining the CuttingBreckinridge affair within the context of nineteenth century dueling culture generally and the increased
sectional tensions that emerged during the Kansas-Nebraska debate specifically. However, the near-duel was
given meaning and political staying power only through interpretation and manipulation by the northern antislavery press, which used the conflict to indict dueling as a product of violent southern slaveholding culture.
The Cutting-Breckinridge affair was part of the larger sociopolitical phenomenon of dueling that has been
discussed by historians of early and nineteenth century America. In her critical study Affairs of Honor, Joanne
B. Freeman explains that duels in early America stemmed from a commitment to “sacrifice one’s life for one’s
honor,” or a sense of self-worth tied up with manliness and, in some cases, ability as a political leader. [excerpt]
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and John C. Breckinridge
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“A Duel!!” In late March of 1854, the
northern press burst with the news. A duel
had allegedly taken place between two
members of the House of Representatives—
Francis B. Cutting of New York and John
C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. Confusion
and anticipation reigned, and a flurry
of rumors circulated. Had Breckinridge
been shot in the neck? Was he killed or
wounded? Did Cutting emerge victorious?
Or was the entire affair a mere hoax? The
situation became so dramatic that it even
appeared in a theatrical advertisement,
beckoning people to see a play that
promised to be just as exciting as the alleged
duel. By early April, it had become clear
that despite the conflict between Cutting
and Breckinridge, an actual duel had been
averted. Although their misunderstanding
had been amicably settled, the affair still
left many questions unanswered. Why did
these two Congressmen feel compelled to
resort to arms? And how did Cutting, a
northerner, nearly become embroiled in a
duel—a violent ritual typically understood
by historians today as an archaic institution
that was confined to the Old South? These
questions can be partially answered by
examining the Cutting-Breckinridge affair
within the context of nineteenth century
dueling culture generally and the increased
sectional tensions that emerged during
the Kansas-Nebraska debate specifically.
However, the near-duel was given meaning
and political staying power only through
interpretation and manipulation by the

northern anti-slavery press, which used the
conflict to indict dueling as a product of
violent southern slaveholding culture.1
The Cutting-Breckinridge affair was part
of the larger sociopolitical phenomenon
of dueling that has been discussed by
historians of early and nineteenth century
America. In her critical study Affairs of
Honor, Joanne B. Freeman explains that
duels in early America stemmed from a
commitment to “sacrifice one’s life for one’s
honor,” or a sense of self-worth tied up with
manliness and, in some cases, ability as a
political leader.
Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown
similarly singles out this pre-modern
cultural ideology of honor as the reason
why political duels occurred during the
nineteenth century. However, he contends
that dueling in this period was almost
exclusively a southern institution and
links it with the prevalence of aggression
in southern society. Likewise, in Jack K.
Williams’ Dueling in the Old South and
Steven M. Stowe’s Intimacy and Power in
the Old South, dueling is analyzed as “a
facet of life [that existed] only in the Old
South.” John Hope Franklin attributes
this use of duels to a southern tradition of
militancy and violence, which was rooted
in the planters’ need to maintain absolute
authority over their slaves. If this was the
case, however, how could a duel have nearly
occurred in which a northerner, Francis B.
Cutting, challenged a southerner, John C.

1. “A Duel!!” The Ripley Bee, April 1, 1854; “Excitement at Washington,” The Daily Scioto Gazette, March 30, 1854;
“The Duel Yesterday,” New York Daily Times, March 30, 1854.
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Breckinridge? Historians like Michael C.
C. Adams have objected to the traditional
belief that dueling was an exclusively
southern political ritual, arguing that “the
disparity in the amount of violence between
North and South was grossly exaggerated”
and most apparently southern traits could
be applied to nineteenth century America
at large. Mark E. Neely, Jr., also contends
that political dueling was not confined
to the South. Both Adams and Neely
use the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict
to demonstrate that dueling as political
violence transcended sectional boundaries.2
Yet the confrontation between Cutting and
Breckinridge cannot be fully explained by
the existence of a national dueling culture;
it also occurred within the context of
the heated and increasingly sectionalized
debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act
of 1854. The Kansas-Nebraska bill was
presented to the Senate in January 1854
after significant modification by Illinois
Senator Stephen A. Douglas and with
the support of President Franklin Pierce.
The act proposed to organize the Kansas
and Nebraska territories by applying
the doctrine of “popular sovereignty,”
which allowed the residents of these
regions to determine the status of slavery
there themselves. Douglas championed
popular sovereignty and justified its use
by explaining that the 1820 Missouri
Compromise’s prohibition of slavery north
of the 36º 30’ line had been “subsumed”
by the provisions in the Compromise of
1850 dictating that the slavery issue would

be decided in the territories of Utah and
New Mexico by local choice. Douglas saw
popular sovereignty as a “great contribution
to freedom” and a way to end conflict over
the slavery question. Instead, however, it
prompted fresh and vehement sectional
debate, with most southerners in favor of,
and northerners split over, the bill.
Southerners perceived that popular
sovereignty would give them a greater
opportunity to spread slavery compared
to earlier compromises. Northerners were
largely divided over the Kansas-Nebraska
measure. A vocal group was opposed to it
for reasons of economics or morality, but
others supported the popular sovereignty
doctrine on the basis of idealized white
democracy or as a method of ending
debate over slavery. These arguments and
deliberations over the Kansas-Nebraska
bill led to several amendments while it
remained in the Senate. The so-called
Badger Proviso, introduced by Senator
George E. Badger of North Carolina,
dictated that no law could be revived that
had either excluded or protected slavery
in the territories, referring particularly
to old French and Spanish legal codes.
Furthermore, the Clayton amendment,
presented by Senator John M. Clayton of
Delaware, restricted popular sovereignty
by forbidding immigrants from voting
in territorial elections. In the early hours
of March 4, 1854, the bill passed in the
Senate, 37 to 14. Among northerners,
however, the margin of victory was much
narrower: 14 to 12.3

2. Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2001), 167-171; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), xv-xvi, 350; Jack K. Williams, Dueling the Old South, Vignettes of Social History (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984), 7 (quote); Steven M. Stowe, Intimacy and Power in the Old South:
Ritual in the Lives of the Planters (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 5-7; John Hope Franklin, The
Militant South, 1800-1861 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956), viii, 44; Michael C. C.
Adams, Our Masters the Rebels: A Speculation on Union Military Failure in the East, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1978), 43-46; Mark E. Neely, Jr., “The Kansas-Nebraska Act in American Political Culture: The Road
to Bladensburg and the Appeal of the Independent Democrats,” in The Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, eds. John R.
Wunder and Joann M. Ross (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 14-23.
3. Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004),
9-27; S. 22, “A Bill to Organize the Territory of Nebraska,” December 14, 1853; “Washington Affairs,” The Boston Daily
Atlas, March 27, 1854; Senate Journal, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, March 3, 1854.

The
Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era
000

“An Altercation Full of Meaning”:
The Duel between Francis B. Cutting
and John C. Breckinridge
Annie Powers
“A Duel!!” In late March of 1854, the
northern press burst with the news. A duel
had allegedly taken place between two
members of the House of Representatives—
Francis B. Cutting of New York and John
C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. Confusion
and anticipation reigned, and a flurry
of rumors circulated. Had Breckinridge
been shot in the neck? Was he killed or
wounded? Did Cutting emerge victorious?
Or was the entire affair a mere hoax? The
situation became so dramatic that it even
appeared in a theatrical advertisement,
beckoning people to see a play that
promised to be just as exciting as the alleged
duel. By early April, it had become clear
that despite the conflict between Cutting
and Breckinridge, an actual duel had been
averted. Although their misunderstanding
had been amicably settled, the affair still
left many questions unanswered. Why did
these two Congressmen feel compelled to
resort to arms? And how did Cutting, a
northerner, nearly become embroiled in a
duel—a violent ritual typically understood
by historians today as an archaic institution
that was confined to the Old South? These
questions can be partially answered by
examining the Cutting-Breckinridge affair
within the context of nineteenth century
dueling culture generally and the increased
sectional tensions that emerged during
the Kansas-Nebraska debate specifically.
However, the near-duel was given meaning
and political staying power only through
interpretation and manipulation by the

northern anti-slavery press, which used the
conflict to indict dueling as a product of
violent southern slaveholding culture.1
The Cutting-Breckinridge affair was part
of the larger sociopolitical phenomenon
of dueling that has been discussed by
historians of early and nineteenth century
America. In her critical study Affairs of
Honor, Joanne B. Freeman explains that
duels in early America stemmed from a
commitment to “sacrifice one’s life for one’s
honor,” or a sense of self-worth tied up with
manliness and, in some cases, ability as a
political leader.
Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown
similarly singles out this pre-modern
cultural ideology of honor as the reason
why political duels occurred during the
nineteenth century. However, he contends
that dueling in this period was almost
exclusively a southern institution and
links it with the prevalence of aggression
in southern society. Likewise, in Jack K.
Williams’ Dueling in the Old South and
Steven M. Stowe’s Intimacy and Power in
the Old South, dueling is analyzed as “a
facet of life [that existed] only in the Old
South.” John Hope Franklin attributes
this use of duels to a southern tradition of
militancy and violence, which was rooted
in the planters’ need to maintain absolute
authority over their slaves. If this was the
case, however, how could a duel have nearly
occurred in which a northerner, Francis B.
Cutting, challenged a southerner, John C.

1. “A Duel!!” The Ripley Bee, April 1, 1854; “Excitement at Washington,” The Daily Scioto Gazette, March 30, 1854;
“The Duel Yesterday,” New York Daily Times, March 30, 1854.

32

33

Breckinridge? Historians like Michael C.
C. Adams have objected to the traditional
belief that dueling was an exclusively
southern political ritual, arguing that “the
disparity in the amount of violence between
North and South was grossly exaggerated”
and most apparently southern traits could
be applied to nineteenth century America
at large. Mark E. Neely, Jr., also contends
that political dueling was not confined
to the South. Both Adams and Neely
use the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict
to demonstrate that dueling as political
violence transcended sectional boundaries.2
Yet the confrontation between Cutting and
Breckinridge cannot be fully explained by
the existence of a national dueling culture;
it also occurred within the context of
the heated and increasingly sectionalized
debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act
of 1854. The Kansas-Nebraska bill was
presented to the Senate in January 1854
after significant modification by Illinois
Senator Stephen A. Douglas and with
the support of President Franklin Pierce.
The act proposed to organize the Kansas
and Nebraska territories by applying
the doctrine of “popular sovereignty,”
which allowed the residents of these
regions to determine the status of slavery
there themselves. Douglas championed
popular sovereignty and justified its use
by explaining that the 1820 Missouri
Compromise’s prohibition of slavery north
of the 36º 30’ line had been “subsumed”
by the provisions in the Compromise of
1850 dictating that the slavery issue would

be decided in the territories of Utah and
New Mexico by local choice. Douglas saw
popular sovereignty as a “great contribution
to freedom” and a way to end conflict over
the slavery question. Instead, however, it
prompted fresh and vehement sectional
debate, with most southerners in favor of,
and northerners split over, the bill.
Southerners perceived that popular
sovereignty would give them a greater
opportunity to spread slavery compared
to earlier compromises. Northerners were
largely divided over the Kansas-Nebraska
measure. A vocal group was opposed to it
for reasons of economics or morality, but
others supported the popular sovereignty
doctrine on the basis of idealized white
democracy or as a method of ending
debate over slavery. These arguments and
deliberations over the Kansas-Nebraska
bill led to several amendments while it
remained in the Senate. The so-called
Badger Proviso, introduced by Senator
George E. Badger of North Carolina,
dictated that no law could be revived that
had either excluded or protected slavery
in the territories, referring particularly
to old French and Spanish legal codes.
Furthermore, the Clayton amendment,
presented by Senator John M. Clayton of
Delaware, restricted popular sovereignty
by forbidding immigrants from voting
in territorial elections. In the early hours
of March 4, 1854, the bill passed in the
Senate, 37 to 14. Among northerners,
however, the margin of victory was much
narrower: 14 to 12.3

2. Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2001), 167-171; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), xv-xvi, 350; Jack K. Williams, Dueling the Old South, Vignettes of Social History (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984), 7 (quote); Steven M. Stowe, Intimacy and Power in the Old South:
Ritual in the Lives of the Planters (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 5-7; John Hope Franklin, The
Militant South, 1800-1861 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956), viii, 44; Michael C. C.
Adams, Our Masters the Rebels: A Speculation on Union Military Failure in the East, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Harvard
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to Bladensburg and the Appeal of the Independent Democrats,” in The Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, eds. John R.
Wunder and Joann M. Ross (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 14-23.
3. Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004),
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Atlas, March 27, 1854; Senate Journal, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, March 3, 1854.
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Although he supported the KansasNebraska bill at large, New York
Congressman Francis B. Cutting
objected to both the Badger and Clayton
amendments. Cutting was a “Hard” or
“Hard-shell” Democrat, and as he explained
in two speeches on January 17 and January
20, this meant that he wholly supported
the doctrine of popular sovereignty and
each state’s right to regulate its own affairs.
Furthermore, Cutting condemned the
Pierce administration for what the Hards
believed was reliance on a coalition of
disparate and sometimes contradictory
interests, including a small group of “Free
Soilers” who supported the unqualified
exclusion of slavery from the West that
rallied around the President for little but
patronage and other benefits. Despite his
frustration with Pierce, Cutting joined
the president and other “Administration
Democrats” like John C. Breckinridge in
support of the Kansas-Nebraska measure.
Cutting’s support of popular sovereignty
motivated his proposal to refer the KansasNebraska bill to the Committee of the
Whole—meaning that the entirety of the
House acted as if in committee and could
thus fully discuss and amend the measure.
This was Cutting’s alternative to allowing
the bill to be relegated to the much smaller
and less representative Committee on
Territories. Douglas’ principal ally in the
House, Congressman William Alexander
Richardson from Illinois, condemned
Cutting’s maneuver. According to
Richardson, movement of the bill would
“kill it by indirection” due to the apparently
large number of items in the Committee
of the Whole that would be ahead of the
Kansas-Nebraska measure for consideration.
Cutting replied that he had no intention

of destroying the bill’s prospects or ending
discussion; rather, he believed wholly in
the measure and the principles of state and
territorial self-determination written into
it. However, Cutting continued, both the
Clayton and Badger amendments violated
the doctrine of popular sovereignty—the
former by withholding suffrage from
residents of the territory who had declared
their intention to become citizens and
the latter by endorsing Congressional
interference with slavery via the relocation
of early Spanish and French law. With
these provisions in the Kansas-Nebraska
bill, Cutting maintained that he could not
fully endorse it—and doubted whether the
House would pass it. Furthermore, Cutting
asserted that the entirety of the House must
“fully discuss” the bill in order to give it
legitimacy as law, because it deals “with a
subject which enlists the sympathies and
feelings of men so deeply.” Finally, Cutting
reminded Richardson and the House
at large that, by a two-thirds vote, the
measures preceding the Kansas-Nebraska
Act in the Committee of the Whole could
be temporarily laid aside. After Cutting
refused to withdraw his motion, the
House twice voted to move the bill to the
Committee of the Whole, 110 to 95.4
Despite his clear explanation of his choice
to refer the Kansas-Nebraska bill to the
Committee of the Whole, most press
coverage portrayed Cutting’s maneuver as
intentionally damaging if not irreparably
killing the measure. Newspapers
representing interests opposed to the bill
rejoiced. In describing Cutting’s speech,
The Daily Cleveland Herald explained that
“the monster is not killed dead, but he gasps
for breath.” William Lloyd Garrison’s antislavery newspaper, The Liberator, described

4. Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, January 17, 1854, 192-195; Congressional
Globe, House of Representatives, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, January 20, 1854, 84-87; House Journal, 33rd Congress,
1st Session, March 21, 1854; Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, March 21,
1854, 701-703; “Congress – Yesterday,” Daily National Intelligencer, March 22, 1854.

the movement of the measure to the
Committee of the Whole as “encouraging”
and the enemies of the bill as “exultant.”
Some papers counseled readers to continue
what Cutting had begun and thus destroy
the bill. The New York Tribune
remarked that
The monster has received a staggering
blow, which can and must be followed up
with energy till the last breath is beaten out
of his carcass . . . . Let no muscle be relaxed
till the last demagogue is convinced that to
attempt to break compacts for the benefit
of slavery, and turn over to bondage an
empire long consecrated to freedom,
is very far off.

By contrast, those northern Democrats who
understood Cutting’s apparent intentions
in favor of the bill commended his behavior
by passing resolutions in his support.
For example, the Young Men’s National
Democratic Club stated that his speech
“reflects a brilliant halo . . . and entitles
him to the gratitude of the North” and the
Democratic Republican General Committee
“applaud[ed] the chivalric conduct of Mr.
Cutting.” Even northern newspapers less
jubilant about Cutting’s action similarly
reported that the bill would likely not
survive its transfer to the Committee of
the Whole; the New York Courier and
Enquirer remarked that the reference was
“very unfavorable” to the prospects of
the bill and the New York Weekly Herald
likened it to “crucifixion.” The southern
press agreed with northern newspapers
that the referral of the Kansas-Nebraska
bill to the Committee of the Whole had
killed it; however, the largely Democratic,
pro-slavery southerners disparaged Cutting
in particular and northern Democrats in
general for doing so. The Daily Morning
News from Savannah, Georgia reported that

Cutting’s “motion astonished everyone.
The southern members [of Congress]
denounce it as traitorous.” North Carolina’s
Weekly Raleigh Register was more combative,
explaining that Cutting and the fiftyfour allegedly “national” Democrats who
voted to “kill the bill” should be “kick[ed]
out of the party—‘they have become
abolitionized’—they are ‘a miserable
faction!’” and utterly “denationalized.”
Therefore, despite Cutting’s apparent
attempt to openly discuss the bill in the
whole House and amend it to more fully
fit the doctrine of popular sovereignty, he
was portrayed throughout the nation as
destroying the Kansas-Nebraska measure.
Public reaction tracked, for the most part,
along clearly delineated sectional lines.5
Southern Congressman John C.
Breckinridge’s virulent and insulting
response to Cutting—and the ensuing
debate between the two that nearly led
to a duel—fits within this context of
sectionalized response to what was perceived
to be Cutting’s supposed attack on the
Kansas-Nebraska measure. Breckinridge,
a representative from Kentucky, was a
pro-slavery, pro-Kansas-Nebraska, and
pro-administration southern Democrat. On
March 23, prior to a lengthy speech in favor
of the Kansas-Nebraska bill delineating his
faith in states’ rights, Breckinridge made a
series of remarks sharply criticizing Cutting
for moving to transfer the measure to the
Committee of the Whole. Breckinridge
accused Cutting of destroying the bill
by moving it to the end of the House
calendar and thus smothering it beneath “a
mountain [of other bills] that is piled upon
it.” Furthermore, Breckinridge explained
that Cutting’s decision could have been
based on little more than “pretexts” that

5. “How It Was Done,” The Daily Cleveland Herald, March 24, 1854; “The Nebraska Bill in the House,” The Liberator,
March 24, 1854; New York Tribune, March 22, 1854; The Weekly Herald and Courier and Enquirer quoted in the
Boston Daily Atlas, March 23, 1854; “Democratic War on the Administration,” The Boston Daily Atlas, April 3, 1854;
“The Administration and the Nebraska Bill,” The Boston Daily Atlas, April 10, 1854; Daily Morning News, March 28,
1854; “More ‘Nationality,’” The Weekly Raleigh Register, March 29, 1854.
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pro-administration southern Democrat. On
March 23, prior to a lengthy speech in favor
of the Kansas-Nebraska bill delineating his
faith in states’ rights, Breckinridge made a
series of remarks sharply criticizing Cutting
for moving to transfer the measure to the
Committee of the Whole. Breckinridge
accused Cutting of destroying the bill
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appeared to support of the bill, because
the Kansas-Nebraska measure would have
ultimately been discussed in the Committee
of the Whole after it had been modified
in the Committee on Territories. To
Breckinridge, the support given to him by
the measure’s opponents in Congress and
throughout the North made it clear that
Cutting had damaged the bill. Southern
Congressman had an appreciated alliance
with Cutting heretofore, Breckinridge
stated, but the New Yorker’s behavior
of late had been that of an enemy.
Breckinridge concluded that Cutting was a
traitor to the Kansas-Nebraska measure and
its supporters; moving to refer the bill to
the Committee of the Whole “was the act
of a man who throws his arm in apparently
friendly embrace around another, saying,
‘How is it with thee, brother?’ and at the
same time covertly stabs him to the heart.”6
Cutting responded to these remarks on
March 27. Cutting explained that he had
made it clear that while he supported the
doctrine of popular sovereignty behind the
bill, he believed it required an amendment
both to fulfill this principle and to
successfully pass through the House. He
accused Breckinridge of exaggerating the
number of bills before the Kansas-Nebraska
measure in the Committee of the Whole.
Cutting maintained that if Breckinridge
truly believed that moving it there would
defeat it, he would not have taken the time
or the energy to defend it in his March 23
speech. Finally, Cutting questioned why
Breckinridge would set out to insult and
attack a supporter, rather than an opponent,
of the bill. Cutting suggested that
Breckinridge’s speech was “unbecoming
of a Congressman,” a personal attack
that was both “inflammatory in style,
and exaggerated in facts.” Breckinridge
responded by claiming that Cutting had

missed the point of his March 23 speech;
Breckinridge had not meant to insinuate
that Cutting had intentionally killed the
bill, but rather that this was the impact of
the New Yorker’s actions. Furthermore,
Congressman William H. English of
Indiana, a pro-Nebraska Democrat,
indicated that there were fifty bills in front
of the Kansas-Nebraska measure in the
Committee of the Whole. For his part,
Breckinridge contended that it was hardly
overstatement that there were an immense
amount of other measures that the House
would have to consider before reaching
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Breckinridge
concluded by reiterating that he could
not conceive of a reason that Cutting
would refer the bill to the Committee of
the Whole unless he intended to destroy
it, because it would be discussed by the
entire House after it moved through
the Committee on Territories. Cutting
escalated the pitch of the debate by
remarking that Breckinridge was “the
last person from whom I expected” such
disrespect, because the New York Hards
had contributed fifteen hundred dollars
to Breckinridge’s Senate campaign when
he was in danger of defeat. Cutting
insisted, furthermore, that Breckinridge
was doing little more than arguing over
the number of measures in the Committee
of the Whole, thus “skulking” behind
the Kansas-Nebraska bill’s position at the
end of the House calendar. Breckinridge,
appalled, asked Cutting to withdraw his
last statement. Cutting refused, stating
that it was “in answer to the most violent
and the most personal attack that has
been witnessed” upon the floor of the
House. Breckinridge countered that “if the
gentleman [Cutting] says I skulk, he says
what is false, and he knows it”— in effect
accusing Cutting of intentionally lying on
the floor of the House. Cutting replied that

6. Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, March 23, 1854, 439-443.

he would not answer Breckinridge’s remark,
because “it was not here that I will desecrate
my lips by undertaking to retort on it in the
manner which it deserves.” 7
Later that day, Cutting sent Breckinridge
a note through James Maurice requesting
that Breckinridge retract his claim that
what Cutting had said was false or else
“make the explanation due from one
gentleman to another.” This would have
clearly implied a duel. Breckinridge refused
to do so unless Cutting withdrew his
insinuation that the Kentucky Congressman
had been “skulking.” Cutting sent a reply
on March 28 professing that he had not
intended any personal insult during their
debate the previous day, but Breckinridge’s
representative, Kentuckian Colonel
Hawkins, declined to receive the letter
because he believed he could not do so
due to Cutting’s potential challenge to a
duel. Thus Breckinridge never received
the message. As a result, he sent a note
to Cutting that he intended to “embrace
the alternative” that he believed the New
York Congressman had offered: a duel.
Over the course of the next several days,
communication fell to their “seconds”:
Hawkins and Kentucky Congressman
William Preston for Breckinridge and the
New York Colonel Monroe and Illinois
Senator James Shields for Cutting.
Hawkins and Monroe were the
correspondents primarily responsible for
determining the precise arrangements of the
duel. On March 29, Hawkins submitted
the terms of the duel to Monroe, including
the suggestion that the weapon would be
the ordinary, or “Western,” rifle. Monroe
responded that Cutting considered himself
the challenged party and thus had the right

to determine the terms of the duel. Cutting
was unacquainted with the Western rifle,
and instead chose “ordinary duelling
pistols.” Confused, Hawkins explained to
Monroe that Breckinridge thought that he
had been challenged and thus maintained
his rights as such. Monroe replied
somewhat disingenuously that Cutting’s
original note, asking for “the explanation
due from one gentleman to another,”
could not be construed as a challenge to a
duel—it was nothing more than a demand
for verbal clarification. On March 30, after
hearing about the confusion and reading
Cutting’s March 28 letter that Hawkins
had previously rejected, Breckinridge
withdrew his statements that commenced
the overtures to a duel and expressed his
regret for the misunderstanding. Cutting
reciprocated the apology, and the matter
was settled. On March 31, Preston rose
in the House to explain that the conflict
between Cutting and Breckinridge had
been resolved amicably, “in a manner
which is mutually satisfactory, and which
is conceived alike honorable to both of
the gentlemen who were engaged in the
debate.”8
What were the implications of this affair
in the context of the era that produced
it—that of the Kansas-Nebraska conflict
specifically and nineteenth century America
generally? As Mark Neely suggested, one
near-duel instigated by a northerner does
not necessarily imply that violence was part
of a larger American political culture—and
even if it can be conceded that dueling was
not confined to the southern states, then
why, with evidence of conflicts such as the
one between Cutting and Breckinridge,
have they been construed as a distinctly

7. Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, March 27, 1854, 759-764; Etcheson, 173.
8. Lorenzo Sabine, Notes on Duels and Duelling (Boston: Crosby & Nichols, 1859), 137; Ben C. Truman, The Field of Honor:
Being a Complete and Comprehensive History of Duelling in All Countries (New York: Fords, Howard, & Hubert, 1884),
438; “The Cutting and Breckinridge Difficulty – The Correspondence Between the Parties,” New York Daily Times, April 7,
1854; Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, March 31, 1854, 825.
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southern phenomenon? The reaction of
the press to the Cutting and Breckinridge
duel, particularly in the North, provides
answers to both these problems. After a
flurry of rumors that were printed with little
discrimination, northern newspapers, and
primarily those opposed to the spread of
slavery, began to editorialize heavily. Many
used coverage of the Cutting-Breckinridge
conflict as a way to indict dueling as a
backward institution belonging to the
violent, slave-holding South—and by
arguing that dueling as it existed through
the nation should not have a place in
the North, the press proved that it held
one. Furthermore, this group of northern
newspapers overwhelmingly blamed
Breckinridge—and southern culture by
proxy—for the duel, overlooking Cutting’s
culpability as the challenger. Thus these
anti-slavery northern newspapers, in the
increasingly sectionalized political climate
of the Kansas-Nebraska debate, used
the disagreement between Cutting and
Breckinridge to assert that dueling was a
southern problem, representative of the
allegedly violent character of southern
slaveholding society. In this way, the
northern anti-slavery press was able to
construe the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict
as an argument against the spread of slavery
and the Kansas-Nebraska Act.9
Immediately after word broke about
a potentially violent conflict between
the northerner Francis Cutting and the
southerner John C. Breckinridge, the antislavery northern press in particular began
to criticize dueling as a southern social
phenomenon that should not be present in
the North. In so doing, these newspapers
proved the existence of a national dueling
culture and then rejected it as the product
of southern violence. The New York
Independent criticized Cutting for lowering
himself to the un-Christian and “assassin-

like practice of sending a challenge,”
blaming northern society for creating a
political culture tolerant of duels by electing
men of “violence and blood” to positions
of power. This editorial maligned northern
culture for accepting dueling, arguing that
it was a tradition not endemic to—and that
should not exist in—the northern states.
Wisconsin’s Milwaukee Daily Sentinel was
less implicit in its sectional indictments and
associations of violence with the South.
An editorial printed on April 19 explained
that as a southerner raised in a society that
explicitly condoned duels, Breckinridge
took advantage of Cutting by forcing him
“into a position in which he must submit
to a most humiliating attack upon his
character and motives, or fight.” Cutting
could not be condemned for his choice
to fight, because “public sentiment at the
North is but half [against] the barbarous
practices of dueling.” This proved a partial
acceptance of dueling in the North and
thus a national political culture at least
somewhat tolerant of dueling. Moreover,
this editorial condemned the practice of
dueling by suggesting that southerners
forced their violence on northerners and
thereby manipulated northern society’s
half-aversion to the practice. The New
York Evangelist furthered this by offering
a virulent criticism of what the New York
Times had described as “the bloody code”
of dueling, calling it “a barbarous and
murderous business” in all cases, whether
involving men North or South. However,
the Evangelist urged northerners to
repudiate the national toleration of duels
as they were “immensely behind the times
at the North” and belonged to the “land
of slavery”—and concluded by criticizing
southerners for using duels to violently
“browbeat Northern Representatives” into
submission to southern interests. Thus the
Evangelist attested to and then rejected the

9. Neely, “The Kansas-Nebraska Act in American Political Culture,” 16.

presence of a dueling culture in the North
while maintaining that it was representative
of the evils of southern culture and
extremely harmful to northern interests.
In this way, the coverage of the CuttingBreckinridge duel by the northern antislavery press proved the existence of a more
national dueling culture while explicitly
condemning it as a backward
southern institution.10
In censuring dueling as a southern
institution in general, northern anti-slavery
newspapers specifically faulted Breckinridge
for the conflict because he was a product
of violent southern society. Writers for
the northern press that supported the
Kansas-Nebraska Act or were not staunchly
anti-slavery, such as the New York Weekly
Herald, similarly blamed the near-duel on
Breckinridge. However, these newspapers
did not perceive Breckinridge’s behavior
as an expression of the evils of southern
society at large. The Weekly Herald merely
expressed its disappointment that the
Kentucky Congressman had anomalously
lowered his otherwise upstanding character
by insulting Cutting and thereby almost
causing the duel. However, the New York
Daily Times, or what historian Mark
Neely calls the Herald’s “anti-slavery Whig
competitor,” indicted Breckinridge in more
sectional terms. Emphasizing Breckinridge’s
quick “loss of temper” and readiness to
“charge Mr. Cutting with treachery” during
their debate despite Cutting’s relatively
inoffensive remarks, the column asserted
that this was
Characteristic of the class of gentlemen to
which Mr. Breckinridge belongs. Quick to
take offence, they are far from being slow
to give it. In dealing with Northern men
especially, whose principles or laws they

have reason to suppose fetter their hands in
the matter of fighting, they are pretty apt to
play the bully.
This perceived southern tendency for
violence was made explicit in an April 7
editorial that assailed Breckinridge for
being “more anxious to commit homicide
than to vindicate his character.” Thus the
Daily Times not only blamed Breckinridge’s
irrational violence on his southern roots,
but also implied that southerners in
general used force to impose their own
opinions on northerners. The Canadian
African-American newspaper the Provincial
Freeman explained that Cutting moved
to refer the Kansas-Nebraska bill to the
Committee of the Whole “greatly to the
chagrin and irritation of Breckinridge
and other slavemongers, who determined
therefor to settle a personal quarrel upon
Cutting” in the form of a duel. Using
Breckinridge as a case study, the newspaper
blamed the brutality inherent in slavery for
the contretemps and exonerated Cutting
entirely. Frederick Douglass made the
relationship between slavery and violent
dueling culture clear in his newspaper,
stating that in his behavior during the
March 27 debate, Breckinridge “showed
himself to be possessed of all the claims
of a genuine lord of the lash” as opposed
to Cutting, who “bore himself like a
MAN.” Here, Douglass entirely reversed
responsibility for the duel by applauding
Cutting’s honor and manliness, while
maligning Breckinridge as a representative
of the violent culture of the slavocracy. By
vilifying Breckinridge as the instigator of
the duel, northern anti-slavery newspapers
were able to use the Cutting-Breckinridge
conflict as an example of the violence-prone
slaveholding culture.11
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This indictment of southern society,
stemming from criticism of duels in
general and Breckinridge in particular,
ultimately manifested itself in the northern
anti-slavery press as an argument against
the extension of slavery and the KansasNebraska Act. The Independent, after
printing a transcript of the CuttingBreckinridge debate in Congress, offered
a brief editorial explaining that the “policy
of the slaveholders for keeping Northern
Congress-men in due subjection, is first
to flatter them with tantalizing hopes;
failing in that, to purchase them with
offices or money; failing in that, to bully
them down; and failing in that, to shoot
them down.” The Independent censured
Cutting for falling prey to “the overseers’
last resort” of dueling, but was much
more critical of southerners by portraying
them as intentionally oppressing northern
Congressmen through corruption or
violence. The column concluded that
“nothing can stop it [southern subjection of
northerners] but the absolute overthrow of
the political power of slavery,” suggesting
that northern political influence would
increasingly diminish under the thumb
of a spreading slave power that used the
violence of dueling as a means of asserting
its dominance. The New York Tribune
continued this line of argumentation,
explaining that the Cutting-Breckinridge
conflict “teaches to the northern Members
[of Congress] who rejoice in the title of
‘Democratic’ is substantially this: Support
the Nebraska bill or submit to be bullied or
shot.” Furthermore, the Tribune indicted
Breckinridge as the “sole author” of the
duel and explained that it was part of “a
well considered plan” to coerce “through
intimidation and violence . . . every
independent northern Democrat who dares

to defy the mandates of the Slavocracy” by
opposing the Kansas-Nebraska bill. In this
way, the Tribune unambiguously portrayed
the Cutting-Breckinridge duel as an
example of the southerners’ plan to suppress
their opponents through unabashed
violence in order to pass the KansasNebraska Act and thus extend slavery.
The Daily Cleveland Herald was more
specific, contending that Breckinridge
and his second, Colonel Hawkins
Evidently meant that Mr. Cutting should fall,
and we are not too charitable to believe that
the death of that man was one of the
means to be used in forcing the passage
of the iniquitous Nebraska measure. It is
perhaps consistent that that “code,” which
finds its advocates on slave soil, should
be called in to back up a measure which
was invented for the express purpose of
extending slave territory.

The Cleveland Herald focused on the
southern custom of dueling as not simply
part of a plot to force the Kansas-Nebraska
bill through Congress, but also as thinly
veiled murder that was used to spread
slavery. Significantly, this expansion
of slavery would ultimately lead to the
augmentation of southern power—and
the perpetuation of the South’s violent
political oppression of the North. The
violent southern ritual of dueling was thus
portrayed by the northern anti-slavery
press as a means by which slaveholders like
Breckinridge could extend their “peculiar
institution” and, accordingly, political
power—in this case, by passing the KansasNebraska Act.12
When southern writers commented on
the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict, they
did not address it specifically—instead,
they criticized anti-slavery coverage of the
near-duel, proving the political salience of

12. “Congress,” The Independent . . . Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History,
Literature, and the Arts 6 Issue 278 (March 30, 1854): 104; “Cutting and Breckinridge,” New York Tribune, March 29,
1854; “Breckinridge and Cutting Duel,” The Daily Cleveland Herald, April 8, 1854.

the arguments those northern newspapers
made. The Mississippian and State Gazette
suggested that northern coverage had
been excessive, explaining that “much
more has been said about this affair by the
press than its importance or good taste
either, admitted of.” North Carolina’s
Daily Register expressed similar sentiments,
explaining that an actual duel would have
exacerbated the excitement of northern
journalists “to an alarming extent.” This
response suggests that the northern antislavery press may well have extrapolated
from the duel to prove a political point that
outstretched the relevance of the conflict.
The Richmond Examiner took this a step
further, condemning “the demagogue press
of Northern Abolitionism” for “railing
out against southern ‘bullyism.’ Already
are the passions of the populace invoked
against southern hauteur and violence.”
This extract from the Richmond Examiner
indicates that southerners understood that
the northern opponents of slavery had
harnessed the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict
in order to condemn the alleged prevalence
of southern violence. The Daily Morning
News ffrom Savannah went furthest in
its censure of the northern anti-slavery
press, accusing “Greel[e]y, and his colaborers in the cause of abolitionism” of
“exhausting the English language in the
search of epithets with which to denounce
its [the Kansas-Nebraska Act’s] friends; and
their tools, instigated by their intemperate
language, are burning the effigies of Senator
Douglas.” This editorial connected the antislavery tenor of the Cutting-Breckinridge
conflict as a method of formulating an
argument against the Kansas-Nebraska Act
specifically and the extension of slavery
generally. Interestingly, however, the paper
cited the New York Weekly Herald and the

Sun as examples of anti-slavery agitation,
associating these more conservative papers
with Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune,
which was explicitly opposed to slavery. By
portraying the northern press—or at least
that of New York—as almost monolithically
opposed to slavery, the Daily Morning News
fed into the sectionalism many southern
newspapers criticized the anti-slavery press
for fueling. Taken together, southern
newspapers explained that opposition to
dueling in the anti-slavery northern press
was a way to condemn the Kansas-Nebraska
Act and the extension of slavery; and these
southern complaints and portrayals of the
northern press proved the political staying
power and salience of the anti-dueling and
anti-slavery arguments advanced by these
anti-slavery newspapers.13
The Cutting-Breckinridge conflict was
a product of its era, a part of nineteenth
century dueling culture and a result of
the increasingly sectionalized political
tensions that arose from debate over
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Yet it was the
appropriation of the near-duel by the
northern anti-slavery press that proved
more important than what had actually
occurred. Although Cutting, a northerner,
offered the challenge, these newspapers
cast a national culture accepting of dueling
as a product of southern slaveholding
society and blamed Breckinridge for the
conflict as representative of the violence
of that southern culture. By portraying
dueling as a function of the violenceprone southern slaveholding society, the
northern anti-slavery press was able to
advance an argument against the spread
of slavery and the passage of the KansasNebraska Act. The argument held enough
political salience to be noted and deplored
by southern writers at the time. If the

13. “The Cutting and Breckinridge Affair,” Mississippian and State Gazette, April 14, 1854; The Daily Register, April 8,
1854; Richmond Examiner as quoted in “Messrs. Cutting and Breckinridge,” New York Daily Times, April 6, 1854;
“The New York Press and the Sectionalism at Washington,” Daily Morning News, April 5, 1854.
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This indictment of southern society,
stemming from criticism of duels in
general and Breckinridge in particular,
ultimately manifested itself in the northern
anti-slavery press as an argument against
the extension of slavery and the KansasNebraska Act. The Independent, after
printing a transcript of the CuttingBreckinridge debate in Congress, offered
a brief editorial explaining that the “policy
of the slaveholders for keeping Northern
Congress-men in due subjection, is first
to flatter them with tantalizing hopes;
failing in that, to purchase them with
offices or money; failing in that, to bully
them down; and failing in that, to shoot
them down.” The Independent censured
Cutting for falling prey to “the overseers’
last resort” of dueling, but was much
more critical of southerners by portraying
them as intentionally oppressing northern
Congressmen through corruption or
violence. The column concluded that
“nothing can stop it [southern subjection of
northerners] but the absolute overthrow of
the political power of slavery,” suggesting
that northern political influence would
increasingly diminish under the thumb
of a spreading slave power that used the
violence of dueling as a means of asserting
its dominance. The New York Tribune
continued this line of argumentation,
explaining that the Cutting-Breckinridge
conflict “teaches to the northern Members
[of Congress] who rejoice in the title of
‘Democratic’ is substantially this: Support
the Nebraska bill or submit to be bullied or
shot.” Furthermore, the Tribune indicted
Breckinridge as the “sole author” of the
duel and explained that it was part of “a
well considered plan” to coerce “through
intimidation and violence . . . every
independent northern Democrat who dares

to defy the mandates of the Slavocracy” by
opposing the Kansas-Nebraska bill. In this
way, the Tribune unambiguously portrayed
the Cutting-Breckinridge duel as an
example of the southerners’ plan to suppress
their opponents through unabashed
violence in order to pass the KansasNebraska Act and thus extend slavery.
The Daily Cleveland Herald was more
specific, contending that Breckinridge
and his second, Colonel Hawkins
Evidently meant that Mr. Cutting should fall,
and we are not too charitable to believe that
the death of that man was one of the
means to be used in forcing the passage
of the iniquitous Nebraska measure. It is
perhaps consistent that that “code,” which
finds its advocates on slave soil, should
be called in to back up a measure which
was invented for the express purpose of
extending slave territory.

The Cleveland Herald focused on the
southern custom of dueling as not simply
part of a plot to force the Kansas-Nebraska
bill through Congress, but also as thinly
veiled murder that was used to spread
slavery. Significantly, this expansion
of slavery would ultimately lead to the
augmentation of southern power—and
the perpetuation of the South’s violent
political oppression of the North. The
violent southern ritual of dueling was thus
portrayed by the northern anti-slavery
press as a means by which slaveholders like
Breckinridge could extend their “peculiar
institution” and, accordingly, political
power—in this case, by passing the KansasNebraska Act.12
When southern writers commented on
the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict, they
did not address it specifically—instead,
they criticized anti-slavery coverage of the
near-duel, proving the political salience of

12. “Congress,” The Independent . . . Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History,
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the arguments those northern newspapers
made. The Mississippian and State Gazette
suggested that northern coverage had
been excessive, explaining that “much
more has been said about this affair by the
press than its importance or good taste
either, admitted of.” North Carolina’s
Daily Register expressed similar sentiments,
explaining that an actual duel would have
exacerbated the excitement of northern
journalists “to an alarming extent.” This
response suggests that the northern antislavery press may well have extrapolated
from the duel to prove a political point that
outstretched the relevance of the conflict.
The Richmond Examiner took this a step
further, condemning “the demagogue press
of Northern Abolitionism” for “railing
out against southern ‘bullyism.’ Already
are the passions of the populace invoked
against southern hauteur and violence.”
This extract from the Richmond Examiner
indicates that southerners understood that
the northern opponents of slavery had
harnessed the Cutting-Breckinridge conflict
in order to condemn the alleged prevalence
of southern violence. The Daily Morning
News ffrom Savannah went furthest in
its censure of the northern anti-slavery
press, accusing “Greel[e]y, and his colaborers in the cause of abolitionism” of
“exhausting the English language in the
search of epithets with which to denounce
its [the Kansas-Nebraska Act’s] friends; and
their tools, instigated by their intemperate
language, are burning the effigies of Senator
Douglas.” This editorial connected the antislavery tenor of the Cutting-Breckinridge
conflict as a method of formulating an
argument against the Kansas-Nebraska Act
specifically and the extension of slavery
generally. Interestingly, however, the paper
cited the New York Weekly Herald and the

Sun as examples of anti-slavery agitation,
associating these more conservative papers
with Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune,
which was explicitly opposed to slavery. By
portraying the northern press—or at least
that of New York—as almost monolithically
opposed to slavery, the Daily Morning News
fed into the sectionalism many southern
newspapers criticized the anti-slavery press
for fueling. Taken together, southern
newspapers explained that opposition to
dueling in the anti-slavery northern press
was a way to condemn the Kansas-Nebraska
Act and the extension of slavery; and these
southern complaints and portrayals of the
northern press proved the political staying
power and salience of the anti-dueling and
anti-slavery arguments advanced by these
anti-slavery newspapers.13
The Cutting-Breckinridge conflict was
a product of its era, a part of nineteenth
century dueling culture and a result of
the increasingly sectionalized political
tensions that arose from debate over
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Yet it was the
appropriation of the near-duel by the
northern anti-slavery press that proved
more important than what had actually
occurred. Although Cutting, a northerner,
offered the challenge, these newspapers
cast a national culture accepting of dueling
as a product of southern slaveholding
society and blamed Breckinridge for the
conflict as representative of the violence
of that southern culture. By portraying
dueling as a function of the violenceprone southern slaveholding society, the
northern anti-slavery press was able to
advance an argument against the spread
of slavery and the passage of the KansasNebraska Act. The argument held enough
political salience to be noted and deplored
by southern writers at the time. If the
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Cutting-Breckinridge conflict can be
understood as a microcosm of the reaction
of the anti-slavery northern press to duels
in general, then their arguments have held
enough weight to persist to the present.
Northern anti-slavery newspapers used the
Cutting-Breckinridge affair to formulate
a case against the Kansas-Nebraska Act
and the extension of slavery at large by
asserting unequivocally that dueling was
representative of the violence apparently
inherent to southern society. Thus the
modern perception of nineteenth century
dueling as a uniquely southern problem
due to the endemic aggression of that
region is an echo of these early antislavery arguments and a testament to the
significance of contemporary political
interpretation in determining
historical perception.

